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1. Introduction 
 
Regionalism has entered a new phase, with mega-regional trade negotiations 
suddenly collapsing and unexpected withdrawals from long-standing integration 
schemes. Deep divisions and turmoil over trade issues have been epitomised in the 
uncertain future of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), where President 
Trump recently called for a renegotiation of the deal. This environment has led to 
questions about the effects of a ‘break-up’ shock. There are a number of notable 
examples, in the regionalism literature, on the collapse of large-scale and/or long-
standing integration schemes: the break-up of empires (Head et al., 2010), the soviet 
block (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2003) and more recently, Brexit (Dhingra et al., 2017). 
Head et al. (2010) explore the trade dynamics of former colonies with their coloniser, 
within a gravity framework. They find that hostile seperations, conceptually not too 
far removed from to a break-up shock, have a stronger immediate negative impact on 
trade compared to a mutually accepted split. While methodologically similar, 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) examine the trade effects of the collapse of the Soviet 
block and find evidence of a strong decrease of home bias in trade relations; where 
Suesse (2018) utilise a game-theoretical model and argue that even the expectation of 
the Soviet block collapse was sufficient to create a strong negative effect on trade that 
impacted on output. However, Thom and Walsh (2002) find no evidence of a 
negative impact of the break-up of the union, measured by the introduction of an 
exchange rate between the UK and Ireland in 1979. Finally, the recent evidence of 
Dhingra et al. (2017) on the welfare effects of Brexit, using a computational general 
equilibrium model, shows that the UK welfare losses from higher trade barriers will 
exceed fiscal savings. In summary, the literature exploring disintegration is limited 
and has yielded mixed results. Therefore, much less is known about the effect of 
negative integration shocks compared to trade integration (Manchester and 
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McKibbin, 1995). Furthermore, the methodologoical approaches used in the 
aforementioned studies are not intented to specifically explore the impact of an 
unexpected shock. Hence, the novelty of this paper is that it focuses on the impact of 
a surprise disintegration on the macro-fundamentals of NAFTA countries. 
Methodologically, the analysis of unexpected shocks or surprises is typically 
undertaken within a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) modelling framework. 
This type of analysis is frequently applied, and the advantages are well understood, 
in the context of business cycles and the monetary transmission mechanism (Fève et 
al., 2018). On the other hand, research using SVAR modelling to consider the impact 
of shocks in a trade setting is still in its infancy. For example, Çakir and Kabundi 
(2013) investigate an export/import shock, Nordmeier et al. (2016) a trade 
liberalization shock, Du et al. (2017) a political relations shock, and, most recently, 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018) consider a terms of trade shock. Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2018) focus on a group of emerging and poor countries and find that terms of 
trade shocks have a more limited impact on key macroeconomic indicators, than one 
would expect based on the findings from models with micro-foundations. The focus 
for Nordmeier et al. (2016) is somewhat different, where they explore the impact of a 
trade liberalisation shock on the German labour market; they find a positive effect 
broadly in line with the existing literature. Du et al. (2017) find that political shocks 
die out quickly, and therefore high-frequency data is required to identify the impact 
of such shocks on trade. The authors also find that gravity models use low frequency 
data, and in doing so fail to identify the impact of these shocks. Finally, Çakir and 
Kabundi’s (2013) global VAR (GVAR) analysis allows the authors to identify trade 
linkages between South Africa and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
countries. Therefore, this paper contributes to this emerging literature by exploring 
the impact of a trade disintegration shock.  
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Furthermore, in comparison to the current literature, we explore a trade 
disintegration shock within a structural panel VAR (PVAR) framework; thereby 
allowing us to examine the effect of the shock on various macroeconomic indicators 
for the three members of NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the US). The main advantage 
of PVARs over traditional SVAR models is the addition of the cross-sectional 
structure. More precisely, the PVAR model can account for cross-sectional 
heterogeneities as well as for static and dynamic interdependencies in a multi-
country framework (Montiel and Pedroni, 2019). In the next section, we properly 
analyse these properties. In this way, PVARs can capture greater variety of potential 
interlinkages than GVARs (Pesaran et al., 2004), which impose a particular structure 
on the interdependencies. These are significant properties that allows us to assess 
and test the potential linkages and spillovers among the examined economies. In 
conducting this analysis, we provide a timely contribution to the literature 
considering the potential impact of a sudden collapse of trade between NAFTA 
members. Furthermore, we illustrate the usefulness of PVAR modelling to explore 
the responses to a trade disintegration shock for the NAFTA participants.  
Our empirical results show a significant degree of heterogeneity in terms of 
macroeconomic responses of the three NAFTA members, and reveal that the US 
economy is the most vulnerable to a negative trade integration shock. Furthermore, 
the US and Canadian economies are found to be more interlinked with each other as 
opposed to Mexico. These findings question the decision by the US administration 
for a renegotiation or full withdrawal from the NAFTA agreement.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
model and the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical results and provides the 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Empirical Model and Data 
 
2.1 Model  
 
Our model is built upon a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) framework, where the 
terminology that we use thereafter is based on Canova and Ciccarelli (2013). In 
general, PVAR models are increasingly becoming a popular tool for examining the 
interactions of several entities (see for example Apostolakis and Papadopoulos, 2019; 
Montiel and Pedroni, 2019). The main advantage over traditional structural VARs is 
the addition of a cross-sectional structure. This is a significant property that allows us 
to assess and test the potential linkages and spillovers among the examined 
countries. Letting y 𝑖,𝑡 be a vector of G endogenous variables of country i (i=1,…,N) at 
time t (t=1,…,T) with l lags (l=1,…,L) and x 𝑡 a set of M exogenous variables, common 
to all units, the PVAR model is written as:  
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖1,𝑡
1 𝑦1,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖1,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦1,𝑡−𝐿 
       +𝐴𝑖2,𝑡
1 𝑦2,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖2,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦2,𝑡−𝐿+. .. 
       +𝐴𝑖𝑁,𝑡
1 𝑦𝑁,𝑡−1+. . . +𝐴𝑖𝑁,𝑡
𝐿 𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝐿 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡,                                              (1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑙  are G*G matrices, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is a G*M matrix and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are the uncorrelated over-
time errors distributed as N(0, 𝛴𝑖𝑖,𝑡) with 𝛴𝑖𝑖,𝑡 the variance-covariance matrix. The 
model can be re-written in analytical form as:  
 
 (
𝑦1,𝑡
𝑦2,𝑡
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡
) =
(
 
 
𝐴11,𝑡
1 𝐴12,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴1𝑁,𝑡
1
𝐴21,𝑡
1 𝐴22,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴2𝑁,𝑡
1
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑁1,𝑡
1 𝐴𝑁2,𝑡
1 ⋯ 𝐴𝑁𝑁,𝑡
1
)
 
 
(
𝑦1,𝑡−1
𝑦2,𝑡−1
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−1
)+. .. 
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              +
(
 
 
𝐴11,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴12,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴1𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
𝐴21,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴22,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴2𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑁1,𝑡
𝐿 𝐴𝑁2,𝑡
𝐿 ⋯ 𝐴𝑁𝑁,𝑡
𝐿
)
 
 
(
𝑦1,𝑡−𝐿
𝑦2,𝑡−𝐿
⋮
𝑦𝑁,𝑡−𝐿
) + (
𝐶1,𝑡
𝐶2,𝑡
⋮
𝐶𝑁,𝑡
)𝑥𝑡 + (
𝑒1,𝑡
𝑒2,𝑡
⋮
𝑒𝑁,𝑡
),   (2) 
 
with 𝑒𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡) and Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = (
Σ11,𝑡 Σ12,𝑡 ⋯ Σ1𝑁,𝑡
Σ21,𝑡 Σ22,𝑡 ⋯ Σ2𝑁,𝑡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Σ𝑁1,𝑡 Σ𝑁2,𝑡 ⋯ Σ𝑁𝑁,𝑡
), 
 
where y 𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables, x 𝑡 contains the exogenous variables 
and e 𝑖,𝑡 are the error terms. 
The unrestricted PVAR specification suffers from over-parameterization; this 
is because even a small PVAR is characterised by high parameter-space 
dimensionality.1 Overcoming this problem requires the imposition of structural 
restrictions. We focus on four groups of restrictions; i) cross-sectional heterogeneities, 
ii) dynamic interdependencies, iii) static interdependencies and iv) dynamic 
heterogeneities. In the present context, it would be unrealistic to assume the 
homogeneity of the examined economies. Therefore, we allow for cross-sectional 
heterogeneities, i.e., 𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡
𝑙 ≠ 𝐴𝑗𝑘,𝑡
𝑙  and Σ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 ≠ Σ𝑗𝑗,𝑡 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. In addition, since we are 
interested in capturing all the potential cross-sectional linkages among the examined 
economies, we assume that our system is characterised by dynamic 
interdependencies. Thus, the endogenous variables of each country depend on the 
lags of the endogenous variables of every other country. Using the above notation, 
this is equivalent to 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑙 ≠ 0 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Furthermore, given the close economic ties 
among NAFTA members, we also allow for static interdependencies. 
Mathematically, Σ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ≠ 0 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Therefore, we let a shock in one country be 
 
1 In the unrestricted version of our relatively small PVAR, with 𝐺 = 4, 𝑁 = 3, 𝑀 = 1 and 𝐿 = 1, 225 
model parameters and 120 error variances and covariances should be estimated. 
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transmitted to another country. Finally, given the relative short time-span, it seems 
reasonable to assume dynamic homogeneity (homoscedasticity). These are the type 
of restrictions that we impose in our model, i.e., 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑙 = 𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑠
𝑙  and Σ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = Σ𝑖𝑗,𝑠, when 𝑡 ≠
𝑠. The advantage of our PVAR specification is that allows for dynamic interactions 
among economies. In this way, our model differs from single VARs that are 
estimated using either data from one country or panel data (pooled estimates). The 
details of our estimation strategy are described in the online Appendix.  
 
2.2 Data 
 
We use annual data for the period 1950 – 2011 for the three members of the NAFTA 
trade bloc (Canada, Mexico and the US).2 The endogenous variables used in the 
analysis consist of: i) historical trade integration index (HTI), ii) real GDP (GDP), iii) 
consumption (CON) and iv) investment (INV). As an exogenous variable we use the 
spot crude oil price (OIL) as a proxy for supply side effects. The selection of 
macroeconomic variables, which are all expressed as log-deviations from the trend, is 
based on the work of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2018) and are collected from the IMF-
IFS database, while the oil price is from the FRED database. The HTI index is based 
on the work of Standaert et al. (2015).3 The index is based on a state-space model that 
combines four alternative indicators of the level of trade integration into one overall 
index. The main advantage of this index is its bilateral nature, where HTI 𝑖 → 𝑗 
identifies country i as the exporter to country j, where HTI 𝑖 → 𝑗 ≠ HTI 𝑗  → 𝑖. In this 
way, we have six different sub-indexes; HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋, HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁, HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁, 
HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑈𝑆, HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 and HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆. Each of these indexes proxies the level 
of trade integration between the two countries (Standaert et al., 2015). For instance, 
 
2 The year 2011 is the last available observation of the HTI index. 
3 We follow the approach of Sims et al. (1990), Lin and Tsay (1996) and Choi (2017), according to which 
it is still desirable to estimate a VAR model, even if the variables contain unit roots. 
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HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 refers to bilateral trade integration between Canada and Mexico from 
the Canadian perspective, i.e., an increase in the HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 indicates that 
Canadian-Mexican trade is becoming more important from the Canadian point of 
view. In this particular case, our results will show the response of the Canadian 
macroeconomic variables to a shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋. Figure 1 shows the evolution 
of the bilateral HTI indexes for the NAFTA members over the period 1950 – 2011. The 
figure shows evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the trade integration across 
the NAFTA participants.  
 
– Figure 1 here – 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Main Results  
 
We start the exposition of our results with reference to the GDP impulse responses 
presented in Figure 2. All shocks represent a 1% decrease in the HTI integration 
index (which we name as a disintegration shock). The left panel on the first row of 
Figure 2 plots the Canadian GDP response to a negative shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑈𝑆. The 
right panel on the first row presents the Canadian GDP response to a shock in 
HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋. In a similar vein, the second row shows the Mexican GDP response to 
a shock in HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁 (left panel) and a shock in HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆 (right panel). 
Finally, the third row shows the US response from shocks in HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁 and 
HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋, respectively. 
 
– Figure 2 here –  
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Findings from the left panel in Figure 2 suggest that Canadian and US activity 
is negatively affected, with the US experiencing the highest and the longest impact. 
Interestingly, our evidence suggests that both economies respond negatively on 
impact. This reflects the strong interconnection between the two economies. On the 
contrary, a shock in HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 and HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋 does not impact economic 
activity in Canada and the US in a statistically significant way. As far as Mexican 
economic activity is concerned (second row of Figure 2), our evidence reveals that 
Mexico is robust to a trade disintegration shock; both GDP responses are statistically 
insignificant. One possible explanation is that Mexican exports could still be traded 
with US/Canada outside the NAFTA agreement, particularly those that support 
supply chains, or to alternative markets without significant increases in economic 
costs.4 
Figures 3-5 show the impulse responses of the remaining macroeconomic 
variables (CON and INV) for the three NAFTA members. The left panel of Figure 3 
plots the responses of Canadian consumption and investment to a negative shock in 
HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑈𝑆. The effects in both variables are negative and statistically significant. 
Investment initially decreases by 0.02%, while consumption is reduced by slightly 
less. Even though the reduction is not large, the variables return to their pre-shock 
levels only after 4 years. The right panel of Figure 3 shows the effect for the Canadian 
economy of a negative shock to HTI 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋. Our evidence suggests that the 
Canadian economy responds negatively on impact. However, the effects are both 
economically and statistically insignificant. This asymmetric reaction of Canada 
reflects the primary role of the US economy. 
 
– Figures 3-5 here –  
 
4 Recent evidence suggests that the benefits to Mexico from the NAFTA deal are limited (Ramírez 
Sánchez et al., 2018).  
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Looking into the Mexican economy, the reaction to HTI shocks presents quite 
an interesting outcome. For the former case (the integration between Mexico and 
Canada), the left panel of Figure 4 shows that Mexican consumption and investment 
increase as result of a negative shock. However, this increase is statistically 
insignificant as the broad error bands depict. For the case of a HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆 shock 
(right panel of Figure 4), the reaction is roughly zero. 
Turning to the US economy, our evidence reveals further asymmetries. A 
sudden negative shock to HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁 has a significant economic cost for the US, as 
it is depicted in the left panel of Figure 5. A 1% decrease in HTI causes a roughly 
0.5% reduction in both consumption and investment. On the other hand, the US 
seems to be unaffected by a negative shock in HTI 𝑈𝑆 → 𝑀𝐸𝑋. The responses presented 
in the right panel of Figure 5 show negative albeit insignificant reactions. 
In addition, we supplement our main empirical results with a battery of tests, 
using alternative specifications, orderings and transformations of the variables in the 
structural PVAR model, to check the robustness of our findings. As a first exercise, 
we estimate the implulse responses based on the PVAR model without the inclusion 
of the exogenous variable (OIL) in our specification. Our results and main 
conclusions remain almost identical. Additionally, we employ the PVAR model using 
alternative orderings of the endogenous variables and we find that the results remain 
robust. Lastly, we replicate the PVAR analysis using the logs of the endogenous 
variables (without using the series transformed in log-deviations from the trend) and 
our  main results remain unaltered.5 
Overall, our PVAR model reveals strong evidence of asymmetries among the 
three NAFTA members. The economy more susceptible to trade disintegration is 
 
5 These results can be provided upon request. 
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found to be the US and, then, Canada. On the contrary, Mexico proves to be quite 
robust to a sudden trade shock. Moreover, the US and Canadian economies are found 
to be relatively more interconnected with each other rather than with the Mexican 
economy. Our results reaffirm the recent evidence of Weisbrot et al. (2014) and 
Ramírez Sánchez et al. (2018), while we call into question the earlier findings on the 
effects of NAFTA by Krueger (1999) and Burfisher et al. (2001). 
 
3.2 Robustness  
To examine further the robustness of our main results, we consider a second PVAR 
model where we use an alternative measure of trade integration and we implement 
higher frequency (quarterly) data. In this PVAR model we follow the same structure 
with our main PVAR but we replace the HTI 𝑖 → 𝑗 index with an alternative measure; 
that is, export share: XS 𝑖  → 𝑗. More precisely, we replace the HTI 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆 with 
XS 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆. In this particular example, XS 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑈𝑆 = ((X 𝑀𝐸𝑋  → 𝑈𝑆 / X 𝑀𝐸𝑋 → 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷) × 
100), where X 𝑖 → 𝑗 represents the exports of country i to j. Given the quarterly 
frequency of the new dataset, we split the sample into two subperiods; 1969Q1-
1993Q4 and 1994Q1-2018Q4 covering the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods, 
respectively. The data for the export shares are collected from the WITS database of 
the World Bank, while the rest of the variables are from the IMF-IFS database. To 
facilitate the readibility of the results, we present the impulse responses of GDP to a 
1% negative shock in the XS 𝑖  → 𝑗 measure. The remaining impulse responses (CON 
and INV) are presented in the online Appendix.  
 
– Figures 6-7 here –  
 
12 
 
Figure 6 presents the GDP impulse responses for the three economies for the pre-
NAFTA period, while Figure 7 shows the corresponding results for the post-NAFTA 
period. Following the same structure of Figure 2, the first row shows the Canadian 
responses, the second row presents the Mexican ones, while the last row shows the 
US responses. All GDP impulse responses for the pre-NAFTA period are statistically 
insignificant. The only exception is the US response to a XS 𝑈𝑆 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁 shock. On the 
contrary, the results are different when we examine the post-NAFTA period. While 
Mexican GDP responses are found insignificant, both the Canadian and the US GDP 
are reduced after a negative shock in XS 𝐶𝐴𝑁 → 𝑈𝑆 and XS 𝑈𝑆 → 𝐶𝐴𝑁, respectively. 
Interestingly, the US GDP reduction remains larger than the Canadian one.  
Once more, the evidence suggests the asymmetry across the three economies 
highlighting the stronger interconnections between Canada and US. The pattern of 
responses for consumption and investment for the post-NAFTA period is 
quantitatively and qualitatively the same with the main results (available in the 
online Appendix).  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The present paper is the first study that explores trade disintegration shocks within a 
structural PVAR framework. The current interest in the NAFTA integration scheme, 
and its potential disintegration in particular, provides an ideal setting to illustrate the 
usefulness of this methodology. The PVAR framework allows us to assess and test 
the potential linkages and spillovers among the NAFTA economies when faced with 
an unexpected shock. Moreover, the recent trend of sudden trade disintegration 
shocks, provides a number of other settings where this methodology could be 
applied in future.  
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By taking into account cross-country heterogeneity, we are able to identify 
asymmetric macroeconomic responses to trade disintegration among the three 
NAFTA participants. The US is found to have the highest losses, while Mexico the 
least. Canada has already started to diversify its export markets by signing new trade 
deals (for example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with 
the European Union and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the Pacific Rim 
countries), which are likely to further mitigate the negative effects of a potential 
collapse of NAFTA. In terms of Mexico, they would experience non-tariff barrier 
reductions (for example, by avoiding the NAFTA Rules of Origin) by trading under 
World Trade Organisation rules, which would go some way to mitigate the 
associated tariff increases. On the other hand, US consumers would experience 
higher prices due to increases in trade costs, where there is also the potential for 
additional US welfare loss due to any retaliation from Mexico and Canada. Overall, 
our findings suggest that a sudden unexpected negative shock on the integration of 
the NAFTA block damages the US.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The bilateral trade integration index (HTI) for the three NAFTA members 
(1950 – 2011). 
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a 
negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI).  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the Canadian consumption (CON) and investment 
(INV) to a negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between 
Canada-US and Canada-Mexico.   
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the Mexican consumption (CON) and investment 
(INV) to a negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between 
Mexico-Canada and Mexico-US.   
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of the US consumption (CON) and investment (INV) to a 
negative shock to the bilateral trade integration index (HTI) between US-Canada and 
US-Mexico. 
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a 
negative shock to the export share measure (XS) for the pre-NAFTA period.  
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of the Canadian, Mexican and US real GDP (GDP) to a 
negative shock to the export share measure (XS) for the post-NAFTA period.  
  
 
 
 
 
